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Synopsis
The corporate scandals of the 21st century have re opened the public eyes to
corruption and white-collar crime in corporate America. With Enron’s bankruptcy and a
public accounting firm enduring criminal chargers, changes had to be made to auditing
standards to try and reassure the public of the accuracy of the financial statements.
President Bush passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to try to bring about reform and
correction to the auditing practice and bring integrity back to the leaders of the public
companies. The main problem that was concluded from the scandals was that auditor’s
independence was being violated and that people governing the finances of the public
companies (CEO, CFO and controllers) were not being held accountable for their actions.
This research paper will go into the actual effects of the rule changes on the Big Four
public accounting firms, with a concentration on the disclosure of audit fees to measure if
auditor’s independence is improving due to the new implementations of SOX. The
results show that although the percentage of tax fees and all other fees has reduced from
2002 to 2005, total fees are increasing from year to year. Because of the vague
classification requirements and the need for public accounting firms to appear
independent there is chance that fees can be being misclassified to show a better picture
then is occurring in reality. In order really see if the amount of non-audit work conducted
by the auditors is being reduced the SEC has to put clearer guidelines on which fees
belong in which category.
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Introduction
Since the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act there has been a lot of research
conducted on the results of section 404, auditors’ independence, and audit fees. This is
important because until the public believes that it can trust both the auditor of the public
companies and CEO/CFO investing will be seriously limited. Professionals all agree that
something has to be done to try and stop the collusion between public accounting firms
and there auditors, but many believe that as long as the leaders of the public companies
are lacking integrity fraud will continue to be prevalent. Still rules were made to try and
improve the auditing of public companies. One of the main concerns is on auditor’s
independence and the increase of fees created by Section 404 and auditing of internal
reporting. I wanted to see how the Big four accounting firms were affected by the new
workload and limitations put on what the auditor can and can not do. I looked at a
random sample of 51 of the fortune 500 companies and analyzed the fee disclosures from
2002 to 2005. The results I found was that although the percentage of audit to non-audit
fees reduced from 2002 to 2005 by approximately 22%, the total audit fees increased by
14% from 2002 to 2005, with no sight of reduction in place. Also audit fees increased by
83.66% from 2002 to 2005. These results prove that Sarbanes-Oxley is accomplishing
half of its battle by trying to limit the amount of non-audit services conducted by the
independent auditor.

History of Accounting Laws and Regulations
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was not the first major change to the auditing
standards and guidelines. Auditing first came about after the economic boom following
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the industrial revolution when owners voluntarily hired “auditors” to look over
management’s performance and their assets. After the stock market of crash of 1929,
economists believed that the public needed to regain trust in financial reporting, in order
for the economy to rebalance and come out of regression. The government adopted and
the Securities Act of 1933 and 1934 to try to accomplish this and bring about a positive
change. The Securities Act of 1933 wanted investors to be able to obtain significant
information about securities being held for sale and “prohibit deceit” in order to give
investors enough information to make their own decisions (SIA-1933). The Securities
Act of 1934 created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to govern all of the
securities industry and markets. It offered investors protection through the anti fraud
provisions which made it illegal to defraud investors (SIA 1934). In 1937, the SEC
started issuing financial and auditing standards.
The 1937 requirements included that publicly traded companies be audited once a
year, independent auditors would be responsible for reporting on the representation of the
financial statements, and making sure the statements were in correspondence with
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (Imhoff). It also stated that auditors
would have to conduct their audit with professionalism and follow the requirements of
GAAS. (Generally accepted accounting standards). With these changes public
accounting firms were handed the responsibility of making sure that the financial
statements represented the correct financial status of the companies in which it audited to
the general public (Imhoff).
Accounting scandals and corruption has been around for decades and in the early
20th century the laws regarding auditing were adjusted to meet new demands. In 1939,
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the AICPA created the Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP), which created 51
pronouncements known as the Accounting Research Bulletins, and formed the basis of
the GAAP (AICPA). The problem-by-problem approach of the CAP failed to provide
enough governesses and the Accounting Principles Board (APB) was formed.

The APB

governed accounting rules and regulations for 14 years, and was responsible for 31
standards, but the SEC realized that the APB was unable to react fast enough to the new
complex business world and saw the need for a full time governing body. (Wikipedia).
In 1972, the APB was replaced by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB),
“the mission of the FASB was to develop standards that would best serve the decisionmaking needs of investors and creditors” (Imhoff).
By end of the 1970’s, both accounting and auditing practices were being
scrutinized for not looking out for the best interest of the public. The accounting firms
were also dealing with increased economic pressure due to inflation and the global
expansion of their major clients (Imhoff). This translated into numerous amounts of
mergers and the Big 8 accounting firms were consolidated into the big 5 with the merger
of Arthur Young and Ernst & Whinney in 1989 to form Ernst & Young and the merger of
Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand in 1998 to form PricewaterhouseCoopers.
The accounting world and the accounting profession saw the biggest change in
corporate structure and regulation after the major scandals of the 21st century. Enron,
WorldCom, and Tyco being a few to hit mainstream. All 5 of the accounting firms were
involved in scandals, but Arthur Anderson and its involvement with Enron caused the
most impact and brought the problem of auditor’s independence to the public’s attention.
The financial scandal of Enron was the first to bring about criminal charges of a public
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accounting firm, which eventually lead to its dissolution. Due to the vast amount of
corruption and white-collar crimes, on July 30th 2002, President Bush passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The next section of this paper will summarize the
important accepts of SOX that effected the accounting profession.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The main sections of SOX that affected the auditing phase within public
accounting firms is Section 101, which established the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB); Section 201 which outlines a list of prohibited activities that
can be done by auditors; Section 203, which deals with mandatory audit partner rotation;
and Section 404, which deals with management assessment of internal controls. These
sections along with Section 302, which states that the CEO and CFO must sign off that
the “appropriateness of the financial statements and disclosures contained in the periodic
report, and that those financial statements and disclosures fairly present, in all material
respect, the operations and financial condition of the issuer” (SOX Act of 2002)
drastically changed the accounting world. Although section 302 has a huge influence on
public companies it will not be looked at in this paper because of the lack of effect it has
on the auditors themselves. For the rest of this section I will go into each relevant change
and give the opinions of professionals.
Section 101 through Section 103 of the SOX act establishes the PCAOB, its
responsibilities, and its duties. It states the board will consist of five financially educated
members, and 2 of those members must be CPA’s but no more than two can be CPA’s. It
also states that board members will serve on a full time basis and they must remain
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independent (SOX of 2002). Over 70% of professionals disagree with the amount of
members on the board and the CPA requirements (Hill, McEnroe, Stevens). Within the
“70%, 23% recommended the board be made up of entirely of CPA’s, 17% thought it
should be comprised of 4 CPA’s, and 60% recommended 3 CPA’s”, the main reason
given included that only CPA’s really understand the scope of the business and financial
statements (Hill, McEnroe, Stevens). Section 103 goes into the actually duties of the
board which among other things consist of registering public accounting firms,
conducting inspections, enforce compliance of the act, setting the budget and managing
the operations of the board. Of the professionals surveyed “73% agreed that the PCAOB,
should conduct investigations and impose sanctions upon auditors” (Hill, McEnroe,
Stevens). It also states, “that the board is required to talk with accounting professionals
to adjust standards and report modification to the commission on an annual basis”. This
section also states that accounting firms are required to maintain for a period of a least 7
years all audit work papers and documentation to support their results. 86% of
professionals agree with the added benefit of this standard of keeping working papers for
at least 7 years (Hill, McEnroe, Stevens).
Section 201 deals with auditors independence, which according to the AICPA
standard AU 220 states that auditors must be independent in both fact and appearance “in
all matters relating to the assignment” (AICPA Professional Standards). Section 201 lays
out an outline of services that are outside the scope of the practice of auditors. There are
9 areas that SOX recognizes as being prohibited which are “1.) Bookkeeping 2.)
Financial information system design and implementation 3.) Appraisal or valuation
serves, 4.) Actuarial services; 5.) Internal audit outsourcing services; 6.) Management
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functions; 7.) Broker or dealer services; 8.) Legal services related to audit, 9.) Any other
services the board deems be prohibited on a case-to-case basis”. The board allows nonaudit services that are not prohibited by the above list to be conducted on a pre-approved
basis. This to try and eliminate non-audit fees being greater than audit fees which could
result in a conflict of interest. According to the article, Auditors’ Reactions to SarbanesOxley and the PCAOB, “80% of respondents said that broker-dealer, investment advisor,
and investment banking services should not be provided along with audit services”,
similarly respondents thought that auditors should be allowed to provide “internal audit
outsourcing services (69%), bookkeeping (63%), appraisal or valuation services (59%).
Regarding bookkeeping and other services related to reporting 95% of large firms
thought it should be prohibited, where only 53% of smaller firms thought it should be
prohibited”. In the other restricted areas the opinions of allowance were equally for and
against the standard.
Section 203, deals the mandatory rotation of audit partners every 5 years, this
standard was brought about to try and stop collusion between long relationships of audit
partners and companies which results in reduced audit quality (Arel, Brody, Pany). An
audit partner is defined as “a member of the audit engagement team who has
responsibility for decision-making on significant auditing, accounting and reporting
matters that affect the financial statements or who maintains regular contact with
management and the audit committee” (George). Auditors must also remain off the audit
for at least 5 years before they are able to return to the audit engagement. This collusion
was made obvious with the crash of Enron and Arthur Anderson. Many people were
unaware of which employees were Enron and which employees belong to Arthur
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Anderson, because of the lackadaisical attitude the Arthur Anderson employees took with
the their clients. Also many of the Enron employees were former Arthur Anderson
auditors, which meant that Arthur Anderson was auditing and reviewing the work of their
former associates which could have effected the auditors ability to be independent
(Herrick, Barrionuevo). Sec 206 of SOX deals with this problem and the problems
resulting from conflicts of interest and states that “the CEO, CFO, Controller, Chief
Accounting Officer or person in an equivalent position cannot have been employed by
the company’s audit firm during the 1-year proceeding the audit”.
In addition to these standards SOX required the General Accounting Office
(GAO), to do a report of the effects of requiring a mandatory rotation of public
accounting firms to try and secure auditors independence. “Concerns about the potential
effects of mandatory audit firm rotation include whether its intended benefits would
outweigh the cost and the loss of company-specific knowledge gained by an audit firm
through years of experience auditing the client” (GAO highlights). GAO concluded that
at this point of time the benefits of requiring mandatory rotation does not out way the
costs. GAO believes “that mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient
way to strengthen auditor independence and improve audit quality considering the
additional financial costs and loss of institutional knowledge of public company’s
previous auditor of records, as well as the current reform being taken”. At this time GAO
is going to keep a close eye on auditor independence and may reopen this area at a later
date when the effects of the recent changes can be determined.
The Section 404 dealing with management’s assessment of Internal Controls has
caused the most controversy of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. “This section requires each
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annual report of an issuer to contain an “internal control report” (SOX of 2002). This
created two responsibilities when dealing with the audit of internal control; 1.) State what
management’s responsibilities are in maintaining internal controls, and 2.) Say whether
the internal controls are effective. The main controversial with statement 404 has to do
with the increase of audit fees. The PCAOB issued “Auditing standard No. 2” which
deals with both section 201 and section 404 and how an auditor should conduct their
audit to achieve the highest amount of efficiency at the lowest cost to the companies. In
a policy statement released by the PCAOB in May of 2005, it stated “that auditors should
integrate their audits, exercise judgments in their audit plans, use a top-down approach,
use the work of others, and engage in direct conversations with audit clients”. The
PCAOB realizes that in the first year of implementation of section 404 the costs have
been too high. The PCAOB feels that is due to the initial start up costs that will not be
present in following years, and the auditors not conducting an integrated audit. Auditors
admitted not integrating the internal controls audit into the audit of the financial
statements and instead conducted two separate audits (PCAOB statement).

Audit

standard No2. hopes to reduce future costs by designing the integrated audit model,
“which combines the audit of internal control over financial reporting with the audit of
the financial statements, such that the objectives of the two audits are achieved
simultaneously through a single coordinated process” (PCAOB statement). With this an
auditor will collect evidence and plan the audit with both audits in mind. It also states
that auditors should use their own professional judgment and mend audit plans to their
specific needs.
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Another main point addressed by the PCAOB is that this model is suppose to be
addressed from the “top-down”, meaning that audits should start at the company level of
controls and work down the process. If the guidelines are followed correctly the PCAOB
expects to see a drop in audit prices by approximately 46%.

Change in the industry
The SOX act did not only change the actually work conducted by the auditors, it
also changed the amount of work and the amount of employees public accounting firms
need to keep up the work load. The cost that the public accounting firms endured to
reach the goals set by SOX was passed along to corporations with the end result being the
stakeholders. The public accounting industry has always had a high employee turnover
rate; the highest being in the senior associate level, “one out of four senior associate leave
annually”, stated a PwC study. The survey states that the main reason why people leave
is the long hours and the lack of compensation. All of the big four firms are trying to
deal with the shortage of junior staff employees by revamping their internal structures.
Although public accounting firms hired 17% more people from 2000-2003, these
candidates have not yet completed the CPA requirements, so there is a big shortage at the
middle manager level. (Accounting shortage). The big four firms are starting to carter to
their recent hires with bigger bonuses, inside referral fees, and added amenities and perks.
(Gullapalli). The survey also stated that that 52.8% of professionals interviewed said that
the accounting industry is less attractive than it was 5 years ago. The lack of middle
managers and experienced staff is a major concern for the public accounting firms and
they are aggressively hiring to compensate. The big four public accounting firms are
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increasing their staff to try to keep up with both SOX and the high turnover. Ernst and
Young had an employee growth rate of 347.8% in 2005 (Hoovers). Public firms are
forced to pull employees out of other departments, turn down new clients, and drop
smaller clients to adapt to the new workload created (Gullapalli). The big four dropped
280 clients with less than 100 million dollars in revenue, and a total of 1,600 companies
switched auditors in 2004 compared to 904 in 2003 (Turner, Williams, Weirich).
The other main difference in the search for experienced and qualified help is that
due to SOX and section 404, public accounting firms are not only competing with
themselves for the “best of the best” but they are now competing with major companies
that are trying to get their internal controls in orders to reduce the increase in audit fees
created by SOX (Jill Lerner).

Previous Research
In November 2000 the SEC made it mandatory for all public companies to
disclose both audit and non-audit fees paid to its auditors. The SEC was trying to
regulate non-audit fees to audit fees and make sure that independence was not being
compromised. In the paper, The impact of SEC’s Public Fee Requirement on Subsequent
Period Fees and Implications for Market Efficiency, Mr. Francis and Mr. Wang use the
fees disclosure for 2000 and 2001 to see the real impact of the disclosure and the
“surprise” factor of finding out the auditing fees of other companies. The paper goes into
how the disclosing of fees affected the pricing of future audit services. Prior to fee
disclosure public accounting firms had the upper hand because it was very costly for
companies to see what other companies were paying for their audits. The paper focuses
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on two periods T and T-1; T equals the year of the disclosures and T-1 equals the year
before the disclosure was mandatory. This is because the SEC made fee disclosure
mandatory in 2000, so 2000 fees would be unaffected by the disclosure. The initial audit
fee data was gathered from Standard and Poors database, then first time audits, audits not
done by the big four accounting firms, and financial institutions were eliminated. The
end result was a sample size of 2,123 firms.
Once the sample size was gathered a few different tests were conducted to see the
effect on audit fee disclosure on the pricing of future audits. The test begins with a
univariate test of the variance of audit fees. The test finds that “variance is lower in 2001
than in 2000, and the two amounts are significantly different at p<.0001;” and “that the
public disclosure of audit fees increased the precision of subsequent period audit pricing
leading to a smaller cross sectional variance in fees” (Francis, Wang). A similar test is
then conducted using a regression residual and the results show that because of the
disclosure it “reduces asymmetry and increases accuracy”.

Through a multivariate

analysis the data concludes that the public companies now how the upper hand and the
“bargaining power” over public accounting firms. “The fee adjustment is about double in
magnitude for positive fee surprises (overpricing) than for negative fee surprises (under
pricing)” (Francis, Wang).
The paper than goes into testing the results on audit pricing for year 2002 and
2003, the sample size is reduced to 1,088 firms having available fee data for all four
years. The results show there is a little change from 2001 to 2002, and in 2003 the audit
fees seem to have made their final adjustments to the initial surprises of the disclosed
fees. With the knowledge I have gained through this paper I will be looking at the effects
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of audit pricing from 2003 – 2005. According to Francis and Wang by 2003 the market
had evened out the price of the audit fees from one year to the next. This means that any
big changes in fees from 2003- 2005 will have resulted from the outside environment.
In 2002, there was a study done by Carson, Simnett, Soo, and Wright done on the
long-term trends of the audit fees paid to the independent auditors. The study looked at
audit fee disclosures from 1984 to 1990 of publicly listed companies of Australia.
Australia companies have had to disclosure their audit fees since 1980. The paper
answers three criteria research questions 1.) Has the significance of the core determinants
of audit fees changed over time? 2.) What is the relationship between audit fees and other
service fees? and 3.) Should potentially significant ‘one-off’ events be considered when
examining the determinants of audit fees?”.
In Australia a “Normal” audit fees is determined through client size (total assets),
client complexity (which consists of number of subsidiaries and fiscal year end), and
Client risk (profitability, prior losses, and audit qualifications). In the model they also
use a dummy variable to control for the difference of the 2 major types of business in
Australian industrial and finance verses mining companies. The study also adjusts the
numbers throughout the sample years by the price Index to make sure the numbers are
comparable. The whole sample size consisted of 11.035 firm years and 1,969 different
firms.
The paper checks to see if any “one-off” factors could have influenced the change
in accounting fees through out the years. The factors that were investigated were
auditing standards (to consists for changes made in 92 and 95), accounting standards
(industry specific standards), audit review of half yearly accountants (“half yearly
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accounts were required to be audited or reviewed by audit firms from 1992, which led to
an increase in audit and non-audit provided after this period”, audit firm mergers, and
litigation risk and costs. The paper thinks that these “one-off” events may help to explain
the unnatural movements in audit fees.
The results found for all three of the research questions was that the mean of audit
fees and non- audit fees for all 16 years was the median was A$33,800 which is twice as
big as the constant sample and the amount of fess paid the auditors for the full sample
median of A$13,400 verse A$34,500 for the constant sample. Also median ratio of audit
fees is 29.1% higher for the full sample period. The results found are that median audit
fees were an average of A$350,000-A$450,000, with the peak fee being obtained in
1993, and audit fees have basically “remained stable suggesting a mature audit market”.
Audit fees showed an increasing upward trend through the 16 years in the study, which
could “raise questions about the independence of the audit firms as firms become more
dependent upon the non-audit fees” (Carson…Wright).
In determining what actually affects the amount of the audit fees the paper
supports prior research and states that the client’s size is the most influential driver on
audit costs in every year of the audit. The paper also concludes that audit fees are
associated with the complexity of the audit, which was measured by the ratio of assets
and the ratio of accounts receivable. The study suggests that the bigger the amounts in
these two categories the more amount of substantial testing would have to be done to
come up with an audit opinion. It also finds that there is a less significant effect on ratio
of accounts receivable on the constant sample, this suggest that this could be a result of
“the learning effects in which auditors adjust their audit approach over time for a
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continuing client to deal with complexity of issues” (Carson…Wrights). Risk of the
overall sample, which was measured by debt ratio and net income lose, has an effective
on audit fee prices. The results show that there is a “risk premium included in audit fees
for firms that have high leverage and lower profits and liquidity” (Carson…Wright). It
also shows that firms with a higher debt to equity ratio pay higher audit fees. The mining
dummy used shows that the mining industry clients receive a discount when compared to
firms in other industries. The paper also looked at the ratio of fees when a firm received
an unqualified verse a qualified opinion, the results show that firms do not receive higher
fees for firms that were issued a qualified opinion and that long standing audit firms are
often offered a discount even though there audits are riskier.
The study also found out that the amount of audit verse non-audit services
obtained from a company had an effect of the fees that they paid; “there is a consistent
positive relationship between non-audit fees and higher levels of audit fees”. The paper
states that this relationship is not from “knowledge spillover” but form the fact that
complex clients require a higher level of audit and non-audit fees.
The results of whether audit fees were affected by “one-off events” varied with
the different events that were tested for relevance. In looking at the impact of auditing
standards there is no relation from the new standards and the pricing of the audit nor was
there any relationship between the merger of the public accounting firms and audit fees.
The paper looked at litigation risk and found it had a high correlation with audit fee
pricing. The paper also states that the results it found could be a little misleading because
there is “difficulty in determining the appropriate time period for trying to measure the
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effect of one off events, given the possible impact of leads and lags on the effect of these
events on audit fees” (Carson…Wright),
This paper concludes that audit size and audit risk do have an effect on the pricing
of audits and that audit fees are in a mature market. It also aggress with prior studies in
that “firms that require a high level of non-audit services are also paying higher audit fees
suggesting that audit fees are not being discounted to obtain more profitable non-audit
service fees” (Carson…Wright). It also tried to find the effects of “one-off” events, but
due to the lead and lag time of these areas the results are mainly inconclusive.
In 1993, there was a study conducted to determine if providing non-audit services
to audit clients creates knowledge spillovers and produces “economic rents” for auditors
(Davis, Ricocheted, Trompterer).

Internal billing records and working papers were

gathered from participating firms, and the fees are broken into auditing, tax, accounting
and other. The paper confirms an obvious assumption that client size, audit complexity,
and risk are highly correlated with the amount of audit fees. It also finds that there is a
positive relationship between non-audit and audit fee, “although purchaser of non audit
services pay higher audit fees than non purchaser, the higher fees are associated with a
proportional increase in audit effort” and not providing economic rent for auditors by
charging a low audit fee for clients that also are receiving non-audit services. (Davis,
Ricchiute, Trompterer). This study proves with empirical testing what we all believe to
be true that audit and non-audit fees are related to each other. This is important in my
study because I will be studying the increase and decrease in non-audit to audit fees for
the year following SOX.

I will be looking at the effects of SOX on the amount of non-
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audit to audit fees provided to audit clients. The implementation of SOX should have
greatly reduced the number of non-audit fees received from a company.
In November 2005, there was a study conducted by Raghunandan and Rama on
the effects of Section 404 mandatory disclosure on material weakness on audit fees.
“The sample included 731 manufacturing firms with a fiscal year end of Dec. 31, 2004
and filed their section 404 report by May 15th 2005”. The paper found that audit fees
were 59% higher for firms that had a material weakness then firms that did not disclosure
a material weakness. However “the material weakness indicator variable is not
significant in explaining audit fees for the same firms for the fiscal year ending December
31, 2003”. The results suggest that although SOX was passed in 2002 many public
accounting firms waited until 2003 to do substantial testing on the internal control of the
public company. The study found that audit fees increased by “105% for firms that did
not disclose a weakness compared to 164% for firms that did disclosure a material
weakness”. An interesting finding was that the increase of fees did not vary depending
on the significance of the weakness of the internal controls.
The model that was used to “examine the association between audit fees and the
type of internal control report” and used also used in prior research of Simunic in
conducting its test, which “measures client size and complexity of risk”. In conclusion
this papers gives clear evidence that audit fees are being effected by the amount of work
that has to be done in association with Section 404, and that when a company has weak
internal controls there is a heavy repercussion on the impact of audit fees the next audit
year.
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Enron brought the issue of audit to non-audit fees received from independent
audits to the spotlight, because Enron was receiving more in non-audit fees from Arthur
Anderson then it was receiving audit fees. Many people feel that this lessens auditor’s
independence because auditors will be less likely to challenge management’s judgment,
because they will be afraid to lose the audit client and the high revenue from consulting
services. From the year 2000 to 2003 total fees increased by 13%, according to article
“the nature and disclosure of fees paid to auditors”. “Overall, there has been a slight
increase in total fees from 2000 to 2003, which makes it difficult to make reasonable
inferences concerning the assertion that auditors can become economically dependent
upon clients or the effect from SOX” (Markelevich, Barragato, Hoitash). For the same
period audit fees increased about 80%, the increased is said to come from a combination
of factors. The paper states that the reasons are “1.) Increased risk of litigation; 2.)
Changes in the scope and complexity of audit engagements; 3.) Transitions from the big
five to the big four; and 4.) Reaction to the new regulatory restrictions forbidding
auditors from rendering certain non-audit services”. Median fees paid to non-audit
services declined from 32% in 2003 from 52% in 2000, which is consistent with what the
SEC was trying to accomplish. In the category of non-audit fees, tax services make up
the biggest percent, and decreased 8% from 2000 to 2003. When dealing with the Big 5
accounting firms, at the time, the median total fees increased by 20%, but median audit
fees grew approximately 91%, where as non-audit fees decreased approximately 27%.
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Hypothesis
From the prior studies done on both the long term trends of audit fees and the
effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on audit fees I have formed two questions in which I used as a
basis for coming up with my hypothesis. The two research questions that I will be testing
are R1: To determine if auditing fees went down in 2005 due to the impacts of auditors
following “Accounting Standard No2” guidelines issued by the PCAOB. My hypothesis
is that auditing fees will be reduced in 2005 compared to 2002 and 2003, due to the
public accounting firms becoming more comfortable with section 404 and starting to
implement the “integrated audit”.

The Big four public accounting firms by 2005 have

been dealing with the SOX implications for 2002, 2003, and 2004 and according to the
PCAOB fees should start to become reduced in 2005 due to the learning curve, and first
time start up fees obtained by the public accounting firms in earlier years not reoccurring
in future years. Although the SEC expects to see an overall drop of audit fees of 46%, I
am only expecting a reduction in total fees by approximately 15%.
The second research question I will be discussing is R2: Determining if non-audit
fees were reduced for the years between 2002 and 2005. On the case of the auditing vs.
non-auditing fees I expect the results to show a big decrease in the percentage of nonaudit to audit fees conducted in 2005 compared to 2002. I came to this conclusion
because from prior studies this trend can already by noticed, but I expect an even further
reduction in the category of tax fees and all other fees in 2005. This is due to the vast
amounts of restrictions put on the amount of non-audit related work a public accounting
firm can do for its clients and still remain independent. Also because public accounting
firms and companies know that people are going to be looking at the relationship between
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non-audit fees related to audit fees to judge independence, both sides are going to be very
careful about having non-audit fee become too high compared to audit fees.

Methodology
There have been many studies done on the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on both
auditing fees and the actual nature of public accounting firms. The concentration of the
rest of this paper will be on the Big four accounting firms and the public companies they
audit. I used a sample size of 51 companies audited by the big four and looked at both
total fees and the breakdown of those fees. I than analyzed the trends of the audit fees
disclosed from 2002 to the most current disclosure of 2005. I analyzed the audit fees and
their relationship between each other and each of the four years being tested. I also
looked at each of the four categories of fee classification as a percentage of the total audit
fees conducted for that year. This was done to examine the relationship of each category
to total fees the public company paid to its independent auditor.

Sample Size
The study conducted is made up of a sample of 51 of the Fortune 500 companies.
The study wanted to look at auditing fees of the Big Four public accounting firms for
years 2002-2005. Since the Big Four accounting firms audit almost all of the Fortune
500 companies, and the revenues made from both audit reports and other work done for
the Fortune 500 companies makes up about 80% of the Big Four’s revenue, the sample
size seemed to focus on the niche I am concerned about. Also because the fortune 500
companies are comparable in both size and revenue to each other it seems like a good
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comparison tool, because the companies can easily be compared to each other in size and
risk.
In choosing which companies were going to be involved in the study I obtained a
list of the Fortune 500 companies and numbered them from 1 to 500, than a random
number generator was used to generate 60 numbers. From those 60 numbers I matched
the approiate numbers to the 60 companies that would be studied.

Data
For each of the 60 companies the auditing fees for 2002-2005 was collected from
the definitive 14A proxy statements of each company. Since 2002, public firms are
required to disclosure their two most recent years of independent auditor fees in their
proxy statements. The fees must be broken up into four categories monitored and set by
the SEC; Audit Fees, Audit-related fees, Tax fees, and All other fees. The information
was gathered from Edgars financial database and all financial information regarding for
the 4 years in the study was collected. Although the study started with 60 companies
some companies were eliminated. Companies were eliminated if they did not have the
necessary 4 years of fee disclosures, if they switched auditors within the 4 years, or if
they were not audited by one of Big Four public accounting firms. After the elimination
process there were 51 companies remaining in which all the necessary information was
collected.
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Findings
R1: Did Audit fees decreases in 2005 due to the impacts of the learning curve and
“Accounting Standard No. 2”?
After I collected all the information regarding the 51 companies I was surprised
by the results that were found. The PCAOB thought that with the auditors becoming
more familiar with the “integrated audit” and the learning curve from conducting the
internal control report in 2002, 2003, and 2004, that 2005 fees would be reduced by
approximately 46%, this whoever was not the case. The results showed a very different
picture when dealing with total fees and audit fees. Average total fees increased from
$5,761,632 to $8,454,771 and Median total fees increased from $5,566,530 to $6,371,184
from 2002 to 2005 respectively. These results can be found in Figure 1. The rest of the
analysis will focus on the median of fees opposed to the average of fees to try and rule
out any outliers that could have contributed to the average being either too high or to too
low in proportion to the total. For the years of 2002 to 2005 the median total fees
increased approximately by approximately 14.4%. Although some of the increase is due
to the growth of the company itself, according to the PCAOB the audit fees still should
have reduced due to the learning curve auditors should be gaining with 2005 being the 4th
year of having to report on internal controls associated implementation of Section 404.
The next interesting results that were found was that although total fees only went
up by 14.4% median audit fees increased from $3,043,000 to $5,589,000 an increase of
83.66%, from 2002 to 2005 respectively. The audit fees from 2004 to 2005 increased
approximately 31%, from 2003 to 2004 they increased 25.13%, and from 2002 to 2003
the fees increased by 6.43%. The results show that instead of auditing fees starting to
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decrease from year to year they are actually increasing by a greater percentage from year
to year. Similar statistics can be seen with total fees, where as although there was a slight
decrease of 7.43% from 2002 to 2003, there was a 20% increase of total fees from 2003
to 2004.
These results are not consistent with my hypothesis because I assumed that total
fees would have started to decrease in 2005, due to both the learning curve and the
amount of services that are no longer allowed to be conducted by an auditor. When
looking at audit-related fees there was an approximately 15% decrease in audit-related
fees in 2005 compared to 2004. Also when dealing with audit related fees in comparison
to total fees there was a reduction from 11.72% in 2002 to 8.72% in 2005 (note: for this
the mean value was used because of the distribution of the median values they did not
total up correctly). Refer to Figure 2 for actual number data. Also the percentage of
money paid to the auditors for audit fees compared to total fees increased 24.47% from
2002 to 2005.

R2. Were non-audit fees reduced for the years between 2002 and 2005?
With the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley there are many things that can no longer be
conducted by the independent auditor that was allowed in prior period. I used the sample
size of the 51 fortune 500 companies to try to determine if in fact fees for non-audit
related work (tax fees and other fees) were reduced in the years following the restrictions.
Total non-audit to audit fees did decrease in the years that were looked at. In this case, I
grouped audit and audit related fees together to make up total audit fees and I grouped tax
fees and all other fees to make up total non-audit fees. Looking at graph 1 and figure 2
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the results show that as the years go by the amount of non-audit fees that are collected are
seriously reduced from 2002 to 2005. The percentage of non-audit fees compared to total
fees is reduced from 32% in 2002 to 10.22% in 2005. The biggest percentage of nonaudit fees comes from tax fees making up 25.94% in 2002 and 10.04% in 2005. Median
tax fees was reduced from $1,015,797 in 2002 to $344,817 in 2005 an approximate
reduction of 66.05%. The category consisting of all other fees also saw a major reduction
where the median fee in 2002 was $61,807 in and $0 in 2005. This is because in all the
51 firms looked at only 13 firms reported amounts in other fees making the median
number be 0. When looking at the average of all other fees it was reduced from 6% in
2002 to .18% in 2005 making it not a significant contribution to total fees. These results
did support my hypothesis that total non-audit fees would be reduced in 2005 due to the
guidelines set out by SOX.

Conclusion
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 greatly affected the role of the independent
auditor. The public accounting firms are learning to adjust to the new standards and are
finding ways to balance out the effects of the new auditing rules. Many firms are
complaining about the increase costs due to section 404 and internal reporting and there
does not seem to be a decrease in auditing fees coming in the near future. Even with the
new scope of limitations of what an auditor can do during the audit, total audit fees still
continue to rise. The money that public accounting firms are losing in tax and financial
information systems fees they are gaining in the new work composed from internal
control reporting. In Graph 2, the relationship between audit fees, audit-related fees, tax
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fees, and all other fees are shown, all the areas are reducing but audit fees are growing at
an extremely high rate. The PCAOB has not been able to lower the cost of audit fees in
2005 even with the implementation of “Accounting standard No.2” and the learning
curve the public accounting firms should be experiencing. The raise of audit fees from
year to year could be from numerous items and it could also be that public accounting
firms are pricing there audits higher to compensate for the lost of both clients and nonaudited related work.

Limitations on Results
There are two main limitations on the results that were gathered in this research
paper. The first limitation is the sample makeup and the amount of the sample size and
the second is the nature of the disclosures. Because I could not gain access to the
Standard and Poors audit fee database or the Compustat audit analytic database the
number of firms that could be tested was limited. I made the decision to only deal with
Fortune 500 companies because of their similar make up to each other and almost every
one of the companies is audited by a Big four accounting firm. Because I had to
individually go into ever company’s proxy statement for the four years and extract the
data I needed and then reformat it, I had to limit the results to the 60 companies, ending
up with only 51 firms. These results are consistent with prior research, but probably
cannot hold true to the entire population of public companies. Also with the limitation of
the Fortune 500 companies the impact of SOX on the smaller accounting firms and
smaller public companies was not tested.
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The other main problem is that critics are unsure if the audit fee classifications
can be trusted. Auditors form different firms are all classifying the fees different ways
into the regulated 4 sections provided by the SEC (Skantz, Dickens). A survey was sent
to external auditors and asked them to classify 25 different services typically done by an
audit team into the 4 categories regulated by the SEC. It found that all 31 participants
classified only 3 of the 25 items in the same category, and all other were classified
consistently less than 75% (Skantz, Dickens). The paper feels that because of the weak
and unclear wording of SOX, and the fact that auditors may want to represent more audit
than non-audit fees, they could be purposely “misclassifying” fee disclosures. The paper
argues that until clearer guidelines of classification takes place it will be hard to know if
different activity is really being done or if the classification of the same fees is switching
categories from year to year.
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Figure 1

Descriptive Statistics: Years 2002-2005
2002
Variable
Total Fees
Audit Fees
Audit-Related Fees
Tax Fees
All Other Fees

Mean
$5,761,632
3,258,382
675,291
1,494,851
349,088

2003
Median
$5,566,530
3,043,100
473,532
1,015,797
61,807

Mean
$6,201,867
3,695,313
615,581
1,761,208
134,051

2004
Median
$5,153,000
3,244,750
500,000
1,015,797
10,000

Mean
$8,131,012
6,146,087
893,835
1,068,540
24,471

2005
Median
$6,230,000
4,624,000
421,541
395,000
0

Mean
$8,454,771
6,850,401
740,707
849,153
15,098

100.00%
75.59%
10.99%
13.14%
0.30%

Mean
$8,454,771
6,850,401
740,707
849,153
15,098

Median
$6,371,184
5,589,000
404,100
344,817
0

Figure 2

Fee Breakdown as Percent of Total
2002
Variable
Total Fees
Audit Fees
Audit-Related Fees
Tax Fees
All Other Fees

Mean
$5,761,632
3,258,382
675,291
1,494,851
349,088

2003
100.00%
56.55%
11.72%
25.94%
6.06%

Mean
$6,201,867
3,695,313
615,581
1,761,208
134,051

2004
100.00%
59.58%
9.93%
28.40%
2.16%

Mean
$8,131,012
6,146,087
893,835
1,068,540
24,471

2005
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100.00%
81.02%
8.76%
10.04%
0.18%

Graph 1
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